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A cultural change to enable improved decision-making in forensic science:  
a six phased approach 
 




There has been an increased engagement by researchers in understanding the decision-making 
processes that occur within forensic science.  There is a rapidly growing evidence base 
underpinning our understanding of decision-making and human factors and this body of work 
is the foundation for achieving truly improved decision-making in forensic science.  Such an 
endeavour is necessary to minimise the misinterpretation of scientific evidence and maximise 
the effectiveness of crime reconstruction approaches and their application within the criminal 
justice system. This paper proposes and outlines a novel six phased approach for how a 
broadening and deepening knowledge of decision-making in forensic science can be articulated 
and incorporated into the spheres of research, practice, education, and policy making within 
forensic science specifically, and the criminal justice system more generally. Phases 1 and 2 
set out the importance of systematic examination of the decisions which play a role throughout 
forensic reconstruction and legal processes. Phase 3 focuses on how these decisions can, and 
should, be studied to understand the underlying mechanisms and contribute to reducing the 
occurrence of misleading decisions. Phase 4 highlights the ways in which the results and 
implications of this research should be communicated to the forensic community and wider 
criminal justice system. Lastly, the way in which the forensic science domain can move 
forwards in managing the challenges of human decision-making and create and embed a culture 
of acceptance and transparency in research, practice and education (learning and training) are 
presented in phases 5 and 6. A consideration of all 6 connected phases offers a pathway for a 
holistic approach to improving the transparency and reproducibility of decision making within 




A number of high profile cases (including those of Mayfield [1], McKie [2], and Knox [3]), 
government statements [4,5,6], popular documentaries [7], and news articles [8,9], have 
demonstrated the issues of forensic science evidence interpretation, and highlighted the 
potentially severe consequences of the misinterpretation of forensic science evidence to the 
forensic science community and general public. As a result, lay audiences have been 
increasingly confronted with the complex nature of criminal investigations and the 
interpretation of forensic science evidence within them, in addition to gaining an increased 
awareness of the potential for miscarriages of justice to occur. Whilst the misinterpretation of 
forensic science evidence has been newsworthy in mainstream media [9], it has also caused 
forensic scientists to acknowledge the necessity of a fundamental stepwise change [10]. Since 
the momentous report from the National Academy of Science in 2009 [11] issues of 
interpretation and concerns related to the reliability of forensic science evidence have 
frequently been raised in reports [12] and academic publications [13]. Indeed, almost a decade 
later, the same concerns and warnings are included in a broad range of publications spanning 
government reports (e.g. PCAST in 2016 [5] and House of Lords in 2019 [14]) the published 
academic literature [15,16,17], and popular media.   
However, within both the lay and forensic science communities there remains a 
tendency to blame quality standard failures in processes, or ‘bad apple’ forensic scientists for 
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making erroneous decisions. There is then an assumption that removing the ‘bad apples’ or 
improving processes, will ensure the reliability of all of the ‘fruits’ of forensic science [18,19]. 
However, all human decision-makers, due to the very nature of human decision-making, are 
susceptible to intrinsic and extrinsic factors that can impact the decisions that are made [20]. 
When the inherent subjectivity of decision making is acknowledged, the importance of 
transparency in how decisions are reached becomes crucial [21]. It is then possible to begin to 
tackle ‘bad apple’ decisions, but also increase our understanding of decision-making in forensic 
science and crime reconstructions in order to provide increasingly transparent conclusions, and 
thereby increase the reliability of those interpretations. Embracing a dialogue between all the 
actors and institutions within the forensic science community is a fundamental step toward an 
open exploration of decision-making within the forensic science process. To ensure the 
integrity, transparency and reliability of forensic science evidence it is necessary to determine 
where issues exist, increase our understanding of the human interpretation processes involved, 
and then find ways to improve the transparency of decision-making processes.  
In recent years, some forensic decision-making processes have been empirically 
investigated. Research in this area has tended to be specifically focused on cognitive biases and 
human interpretation issues, pioneered by several scholars [22], and, in particular, Dror 
[23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30], whose research into the effects of cognitive bias, whilst initially 
controversial, has led to an increase of related research in a number of forensic science 
disciplines including DNA [31], fingerprints [27], blood pattern analysis [32,33], forensic 
odontology [34], forensic anthropology [35,36], handwriting analysis [37], ballistics [38], 
footwear analysis [39], and forensic entomology [40]. Indeed ‘bias’ has become something of 
a buzz word within forensic science research, conferences, and meetings, emerging as a distinct 
and increasingly recognised field of interest in forensic science, and becoming a motivational 
factor for organizational change [24,41,42].  
Some have argued that a disproportionate level of attention has been dedicated to 
subjective decision-making. It is argued that this preoccupation is preventing the forensic 
science domain from focusing on increasing the objectivity with which forensic science 
evidence can be interpreted, through a better understanding of the traces themselves [43] by, 
for example, carrying out empirical studies aimed at understanding the persistence and 
transferability of traces [44,45]. Others have responded by arguing that there is not, in fact, an 
overrepresentation of research into the factors that affect decision-making within forensic 
science, and that research establishing the existence and mitigation of cognitive bias, the impact 
of context, and the more objective use of trace evidence need not be mutually exclusive [46,47]. 
In the light of this, Buckleton et al. [48] use the illustration of the ‘human machine’, clarifying 
that there is not an argument to do away with the notion of subjective human decision-making 
within forensic science, rather that there is much that can be done to aid this process, using an 
empirical knowledge base, and an appropriate forensic science evidence base. Whilst the 
challenges in human decision-making have been increasingly documented, it is important to 
acknowledge that there are also great strengths in the capability of humans to make nuanced, 
context sensitive and complex decisions which need to be retained if we are to be engaged in 
the scientific endeavour of forensic reconstruction [49]. 
 
There has been increasing recognition of empirical studies that can contribute to an evidence 
based approach to the interpretation of forensic science evidence [50,51,52,53]. It has been 
asserted that empirical research, rather than an overreliance on training and experience, must 
become the central method by which assertions are justified [52], along with problem solving 
approaches that take into account the context of each case [54,55,56].  Notably, the 2016 
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PCAST report [5] and the UK Forensic Science Regulator report [57] highlighted that forensic 
practitioners cannot rely on experience and extensive casework as a substitute for empirical 
studies of scientific validity. It is important not to create a dichotomy between empirical data 
evidence bases, and expertise and training, with calls for forensic science to engage with 
reconstruction approaches that include both forms of knowledge, but in a clear and transparent 
way [47]. Both empirical evidence bases and more tacit forms of knowledge that form expertise 
need to be harnessed to address the complex challenge of reliable interpretation of forensic 
science evidence given the nature of forensic reconstruction [21]. 
 
The production of empirical data that can contribute to an evidence base for forensic 
reconstruction that incorporates the intrinsic aspect of human decision-making has been aided 
by researchers who have begun to look beyond cognitive bias within forensic science. A 
consideration of judgment and decision theories [58,59,60], while acknowledging the breadth 
and complexity of human decision-making [61,62,63,64] offers valuable insights for the 
development of understanding the psychological processes behind the decisions being made in 
forensic science.  However, we argue that there is a need for a more structured, inclusive, and 
sustainable approach to improve our understanding of decision-making within forensic science, 
and to aid the transparency of the conclusions that are reached in the interpretation of forensic 
science evidence. We present here a dynamic six-phased model (Figure 1), that addresses the 
critical component of human decision-making in holistic forensic reconstructions (as outlined 
in component 4 of the FORTE model [21]).  The model outlines what is needed to achieve 
improved decision-making in forensic science for transparent, reproducible and robust crime 
reconstructions: 
 
Phase 1: Mapping of the decisions that are made throughout the forensic process from 
crime scene to court.  
Phase 2: Consideration of the role and interdependencies of forensic science decisions 
within the wider criminal justice system  
Phase 3: Applying established empirical knowledge from other domains into forensic 
science judgment and decision-making research, 
Phase 4: Suitable communication and dissemination of findings from decision-making 
research within the forensic community and the wider CJS, 
Phase 5: Managing the risk of misinterpretation 
Phase 6: Embedding the inclusion of decision-making as part of the forensic science 






Figure 1: an overview of the proposed six-phased approach to improved decision-making within 
forensic science 
   
Phase 1: A structured examination of forensic science decisions from crime scene to court 
In order to fully understand and improve the reliability of the outcomes of the entire forensic 
science process (the collection, analysis, interpretation, and presentation of evidence as set out 
in Figure 2), it is important to acknowledge, investigate and understand each decision that is 
made both individually and interdependently. Forensic science procedures are made up of a 
number of decisions, many of which are not traditionally seen as being interpretative in nature. 
However, the outcome of these decisions may significantly influence interpretations that are 
made at later stages. For example, deciding upon an evidence recovery strategy at a crime scene 
may sometimes be influenced by what information examiners at the crime scene have been 
exposed to, be this from the call room, the CSI log, the investigating officer, or communication 
with the victim at the scene [65]. It is not always simple and self-evident what information is 
relevant and irrelevant in order to decide what to prioritise. This has the potential to create 
interpretive difficulties at a later stage if the decisions about what to collect at the crime scene 
have been influenced by misleading information or irrelevant context [36,66].   Similarly, 
decisions made at the crime scene or laboratory to process certain finger marks rather than 
others have the potential to be crucial in the interpretation and subsequent intelligence 
gathering stages [67]. Thus the recovery of certain traces at the scene, or from crime scene 
evidence, can have an impact upon the possibility of subsequent analysis and/or  interpretation.  
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Methodologies from the published literature in ergonomics is beneficial to ensure that the 
complexities of the human factors associated with the forensic science process are 
comprehensively recognised. The determination of points at which decisions are made should 
be based on more than just a standard operating procedure or reported process. Rather, this 
information must be gleaned from observations of processes in action within real world 
environments, so as to establish the ‘hidden’ decisions, judgements, and interpretations, and to 
establish the interactions between the person, the environment, and the technology required to 
meet each goal of the practitioner. The use of Hierarchical Task Analysis [69,70] allows goals 
to be broken down into smaller goals and plans, enabling complex processes to be described 
as a series of hierarchical simpler processes, while Cognitive Task Analysis [71] can be used 
to establish the cognitive skills required to reach a goal. Considering forensic science processes 
and the human and cognitive interactions with these processes in this structured way can enable 
a comprehensive understanding of the requirements placed upon the human practitioner 
(beneficial in training and learning [70], as discussed in Phase 5), and can help to clearly 
illustrate ‘hidden’ decisions, judgements and interpretations within the forensic science 
process. Such approaches have been used to consider aspects of teamwork and performance in 
crime scene investigations [72]. 
Figure 2 depicts the interconnectedness within the forensic science process and 
therefore the critical impact that decision-making has at each stage. It is also clear that decisions 
at each stage of the process can influence subsequent processes and decisions.  It is therefore 
important to consider the whole process (from crime scene to court) and it is crucial that the 
capabilities, requirements and thresholds of each dependent stakeholder are acknowledged by 
each decision maker. Additionally, such considerations must be made within a wider context 
than the forensic science process, as described in Phase 2, and depicted in Figure 3. 
Phase 2: A structured examination of the wider decision ecology of the Criminal Justice 
System 
Following an acknowledgment of the interlinking and complex web of decisions being made 
within the forensic science process, there is a need to recognize that forensic science sits within 
the wider ecology of the criminal justice system (CJS) [47,73], in which wider investigative 
and legal decisions are made (see Figure 3). While stakeholders within policing and the court 
system may be making key simultaneous and interdependent decisions, it is important to 
acknowledge that key decisions are also made by professional and regulatory bodies, for 
example, UKAS and the Forensic Science Regulator in the UK, as well as international 
working groups such as European Network of Forensic Science (ENFSI) and Organisation of  
Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science (OSAC), which may impact upon the forensic 
science process. Similarly, education and training institutes continue to influence the way that 




Figure 3: an illustration of the interdependent phases with their own associated decisions, 
within the forensic, investigative policing, and legal fields (Morgan et al., 2018 [74]) 
Thus, by virtue of the complex nature of decision-making in the criminal justice system, 
it is not sufficient to solely consider the decisions made by the forensic examiner when aiming 
to maximize the effectiveness of these decisions. Rather, the interactions and impact of a 
decision process should be considered within a wider context of their interactions with all 
stakeholders in the CJS (as summarised in Figure 3), in order to effectively, transparently, and 
reliably convey the weight of the forensic evidence within a case and ensure the value of the 
forensic science process. A failure to acknowledge and respond to the interlinking nature of 
stakeholders within the CJS could lead to an inappropriate use of evidence in a court or 
intelligence setting. For example, evidence disclosed to the police as a result of one isolated 
piece of forensic science analysis could begin to suggest a particular scenario, which could lead 
to tunnel vision within the police investigation due to the high motivation to identify and 
apprehend a suspect [75,76]. Conversely, the opinion of the police (which could also 
potentially be led by tunnel vision [75,77], cascade bias (the impact of contextual information 
at one stage in the reconstruction process impacting decisions being made at a later stage) and 
snowball bias (when a number of pieces of contextual information interact and have an 
increasing ‘snowballing’ impact on a decision that is made) [66], driven by other aspects of the 
investigation [78,79]) could impact upon the communication strategy of the police to forensic 
scientists. For example, when dealing with ambiguous evidence from a complex crime scene, 
a scenario could occur where the police and/or the prosecution have a strong belief of the guilt 
of a suspect. In such a scenario it is possible that the forensic scientist might be unconsciously 
steered towards a certain decision outcome, leading, in some cases, to an overestimation of the 
analysis [80]. This may be compounded if the forensic scientist is, as is commonly the case, 
employed by the prosecution [76]. 
Thus, each stakeholder needs to have a greater understanding of the role, requirements, 
capabilities, and limitations of the work of other stakeholders within the CJS. If, for example, 
police officers are not aware of the true probative value or discriminatory power stated in the 
results of a forensic examination, they may either put an understated or overstated weighting 
on this evidence when interviewing a suspect [81]. Being able to communicate how the 
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meaning and weight of a conclusion has been reached, and explain any limitations of the 
outcome of the analysis and interpretations made is crucial to ensure the appropriate use of 
such evidence throughout the investigation. It is also possible to argue that having some 
understanding of how a result from the analysis of a forensic trace may contribute to an 
investigation could allow the forensic scientist to provide this result in the most appropriate 
and usable format. 
In addition to ensuring that the potential of forensic science evidence is maximized in 
relation to evaluating source and activity level hypotheses, an awareness of the roles and 
processes of each key stakeholder is crucial in order to maximize timeliness of intelligence 
within an investigation. Recent approaches to enabling the rapid communication of indicative 
(as opposed to conclusive) forensic findings such as the use of Streamlined Forensic Reporting 
(SFR) within fingerprint comparison, have ensured that evidence can be utilized to provide 
swift provisional intelligence within an investigation [82]. The introduction of such processes 
has helped foster a mind-set in which forensic science becomes a part of the police 
investigation, leading to a scientific grounding to the direction of the investigation, as opposed 
to solely being a mechanism for providing the evidence for the propositions of the investigative 
team. Thus, it is crucial that investigators are aware of the limitations of the SFR results with 
which they are provided. If these results are an initial indication of the outcome of an 
interpretation but have not been through the entirety of a validated process in place to ensure 
the robustness of that interpretation (including aspects such as blind verification), then this 
should be clearly communicated to the investigative team, informing their own communication 
in relation to the weight of the evidence. This being the case, it is more important than ever that 
scientists and investigators are aware of their own role and that of other actors within the system 
in order to maximize the value and reliability of all intelligence and/or evidence.  Additionally, 
the outcome of decisions made by regulatory and training stakeholders (which, in the UK, 
include reports such as  the codes of practice issued by the Forensic Science Regulator, the 
components of mandatory UKAS accreditation , and the scope of training provided  [83]) have 
the potential to impact upon the processes and information available for forensic decision-
making, and so the breadth, and depth of this evidence base and its influences within the 
network also needs to be considered. 
Given that the ultimate decision to utilize forensic evidence for the purpose of legal 
truth-finding lies within the judicial system, a better understanding of the interdependent 
inferences and underlying uncertainties of decisions made regarding forensic science evidence 
is clearly critical. This requires, on the one hand, better communication and understanding of 
the meaning and limitations (including the validity of methods) of the decisions made 
throughout the process illustrated in Figure 3, in order to allow the Trier-of-fact to make a 
transparent, reproducible as well as robust decisions [84]. Given that forensic reconstruction 
approaches necessarily have to incorporate an understanding of a variety of activities that have 
taken place in a complex real world environment, uncertainty must be acknowledged to be 
inherent in any forensic reconstruction approach. Decision-making leading to the interpretation 
of what forensic science evidence means in a given scenario will therefore always be carried 
out with intrinsic uncertainty caused by missing information and inherent limitations of 
reconstruction methods ([21,47,85].  Therefore, it is not only the judicial system that can act as 
a gatekeeper to ensure reliable evidence is admitted, but forensic scientists and investigative 
teams should also be providing a transparent and critical (yet helpful) presentation of the value 
of the evidence in the light of the proposed hypotheses [86]. 
8 
 
To date, the requirements of both the legal and scientific domains have been addressed 
by developing the evidence base behind the behaviour of forensic traces through empirical 
research in many different fields within forensic science based upon the abundance of 
properties, the effects of evidence dynamics, the processes affecting collection and analysis 
methods, and by developing methods to assist in drawing justifiable and transparent inferences 
[87,86]. However, it is crucial to also identify each decision, and the interactions of that 
decision with other decisions made, the stakeholders in the process, along with this evidence 
base, at each stage from crime scene to court (Figure 3), Methodologies from the ergonomics 
and human factors literature [69,70,71] can be of benefit in achieving this aim, as set out in 
Phase 1.  It is also important that the mechanisms behind each of these decisions are better 
understood in order to maximize the reliability, efficiency, and validity of inferences and 
conclusions provided to investigators and to the court, as explored in Phase 3. 
Phase 3: Applying judgement and decision-making/psychological theory to empirical 
research within forensic science 
Once the decisions and interpretations, and their interactions, within the forensic and wider 
criminal justice process have been identified it is crucial to understand the mechanisms of 
decision-making within this forensic context. Each decision can be considered in terms of the 
desired outcome (how success can be measured), the intrinsic factors influencing the outcome 
of the decision and the extrinsic factors that may have an influence on the decision-making 
process and outcome [89]. Each of these aspects needs to be explored in order to be able to 
provide a robust evidence base to support transparent and reliable forensic decision-making. 
This evidence base must be relevant to the operational reality of forensic science practice 
through ecologically valid empirical study, rather than a simple transfer of findings from the 
judgement and decision-making domain into forensic reconstruction approaches, given the 
complexities of forensic decisions within existing policies and procedures [90,91,92].  
Given the complexity of understanding the decision-making mechanisms within 
forensic reconstruction approaches there is the need for further research to address the 
following gaps: 
a) Not all forensic science domains have empirical data that addresses decision-making 
Research which has looked to investigate and empirically assess the effectiveness of 
decision-making within forensic science has been carried out in a number of forensic 
domains, but has been focussed within the fields of identification such as fingerprinting 
[27,93] and DNA analysis [94]. There is, therefore, a paucity of research within many other 
forensic domains [95], paralleled by a reluctance to accept that the inherent limitations of 
the subjective nature of human decision-making can lead to misinterpretations of the 
meaning of evidence in specific contexts. Whilst it is clear that there is broad transferability 
of research findings that address decision-making in forensic science, it is also crucial that 
empirical research addresses all domains of forensic science, as the decisions, processes, 
procedures, and circumstances will be context sensitive and vary to some extent between 
individual domains. 
 
b) Empirical examination of decision-making has lacked a joined-up approach from crime 
scene to court 
To date, not all stages of the forensic science process (Figure 2) have been addressed by 
published empirical studies in relation to decision-making. Published research has, instead, 
tended to focus upon the more traditionally considered interpretative aspects of forensic 
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science occurring at the analysis stages of the process, primarily the comparison between 
a crime scene trace and suspect sample [96,97]. This focused approach has led to a paucity 
of research addressing the processes involved in, and the efficiency of, decisions made at 
earlier (and, indeed, later) stages of the forensic science process. A particular example is 
the empirical study of decision-making at the crime scene. There are many crucial 
judgements and decisions made at the crime scene, for example, how to approach a search 
of the scene, or how to assess which items to recover as exhibits as part of a strategic 
approach to intelligence gathering [56]. These decisions are often made under the highly 
pressured and emotive conditions which are considered to be potential fuels for 
subconscious influences in decision-making [98]. Given the environment in which these 
decisions are made and the potential for snowball effect and cascade bias within decision-
making later in the forensic reconstruction process [66], it is important that empirical 
studies are extended to cover a wider remit of forensic reconstruction decisions, 
encompassing the whole forensic reconstruction process [21]. Equally, the impact of the 
presentation of findings of the forensic science process on the judgements, decisions, and 
interpretations of the investigative team, key stakeholders within the legal domain, and 
judges and juries should be comprehensively explored, both in terms of the existing 
mechanisms of reporting forensic outcomes and also in relation to the application of new 
techniques and technology (for example the use of 3D technology [99] or virtual reality 
reconstruction within the courtroom [100,101], or the application of novel approaches to 
data collection [102], analysis [103], or interpretation [104,105]). The breadth of 
knowledge within the jury studies literature [62,106,107,108,109] should be considered in 
application to the context specific nature of forensic science evidence, acknowledging that 
the specific  nature of the evidence presented in each case will be different. The 
comprehensive mapping of decisions and interpretations as described in phases 1 and 2 
will highlight these ‘hidden decisions’ throughout the forensic science process and should 
direct the focus of empirical study. 
 
c) Establishing the presence of cognitive bias has become the focus of decision-making 
research  
The body of knowledge concerning judgement and decision-making and human factors is 
broad, encompassing a wide range of theories, and addressing a broad range of attributes, 
going far beyond the consideration of cognitive bias alone which has become a focus within 
decision-making within forensic science [95]. Indeed, there are many aspects of 
psychological and human factors theory that have been applied to other domains that 
involve human expertise (such as medicine [110] or aviation [111]), or have been used by 
psychologists to explore or explain human decisions. Edmond et al. [112] presented a 
number of such theories from human perception, memory, expertise, decision-making, 
communication and feedback in relation to the forensic science process so as to highlight 
the potential application of these theories within forensic science, encouraging forensic 
practitioners to engage with such research in order to maximise the outcome of their 
forensic interpretations. Examples included areas of psychological study such as the 
fallibility of perception and memory, a tendency for overconfidence, and the specific nature 
and vulnerabilities of expertise [112]. Indeed, there are many areas in which forensic 
science can learn from the broad range of literature on human factors originating from many 
different domains of study. There is potential (and need) to consider the application of the 
empirical evidence that addresses the different aspects of research into human performance, 
human factors, and decision-making to the specific interpretations and decisions made 
throughout the forensic science process. For example, there are theories of human decision-
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making that suggest that the environment in which a comparative judgement is made and 
working memory are important in that judgement [113,114,115,116], the language of signal 
detection theory [117] may be helpful to discuss the detection and quality assessment of 
forensic traces [118], the anchoring heuristic [119] may, perhaps, play a role in forensic 
interpretations that involve numerical values, there may be merit in the application of the 
principles and techniques of the cognitive interview [120] in gaining accurate recall of 
events at the crime scene, and considering distributed cognition [66,72] may be valuable 
when there are interconnected decisions and interpretations throughout the forensic science 
process..  It is important, however, that novel empirical research tests hypotheses around 
the application of these existing theories within a range of ecologically valid forensic 
contexts in order to ensure that the outcomes and findings are representative of real world 
forensic practice as the real world environment is very different from what can be replicated 
in a psychology laboratory setting. This approach provides an opportunity to expose actual 
decision-specific vulnerabilities, mitigate negative effects and increase performance, and 
identify and accept, through empirical evidence, the inherent limitations of the ‘human 
machine’ [46] to ensure transparency, proportionality and robustness in forensic decision-
making.  
Appreciating the need for a comprehensive, interdisciplinary approach to the understanding 
of decision-making and interpretations within forensic science provides a promising pathway 
to be able to increase the transparency and effectiveness of current decisions throughout the 
forensic science process. 
 
Therefore, collating the findings and underlying conceptual frameworks in empirical 
studies provides the opportunity to improve the evidence base, accuracy, and transparency, of 
forensic reconstruction inferences.  A key precedent to achieving this will be the approaches 
developed to effectively communicate and disseminate the findings of this research into the 
forensic chain and the wider criminal justice system [86], as will be discussed in Phase 4. 
Phase 4: Improving the communication and dissemination of novel decision-making 
research  
It was not until recently that stakeholders with the power to influence policies have presented 
the findings of significant decision-making research in their reports and urged their importance 
in forensic practice [121,122]. In addition, the development of ‘cognitive forensics’ as a distinct 
field within forensic science research at international conferences and meetings has enabled 
the communication of research findings that address the influences on decision-making within 
the forensic reconstruction process. However, communicating the findings of specific 
empirical research on the influences on decision-making remains problematic, particularly 
outside of an academic setting, in the following ways: 
a) Bridging the gap between psychological theories and forensic specialists 
Whilst research into forensic decision-making needs to draw more heavily upon a wide 
range of psychological approaches and theories, the findings of any such research also 
needs to be accessible to the forensic scientist and the environment within which the 
forensic reconstruction is carried out. This means foremost that the results need to be clearly 
accessible, visible, and explained in appropriate terminology and language so that the 
importance of the findings are recognised, the value of the findings is clear and the practical 
implications provided in a manner that is sensitive to the different contexts and drivers of 
key stakeholders [21,47].  
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Research that addresses the influences on decision-making, including the research that 
identifies as ‘cognitive forensics’ should, perhaps, be more successfully integrated within 
existing forensic science domains, as opposed to being thought of as a separate entity. It is 
important to establish a balance between developing a specialist area of decision-making 
in forensic science, whilst also successfully integrating it into the different forensic fields 
alongside, for example, research on analytical techniques, transfer and persistence studies, 
population studies, and statistical interpretation methods. Equally, researchers addressing 
decision-making in forensic science need to incorporate the requirements of the forensic 
practitioner into the research questions and research design to ensure that the findings are 
casework informed and implementable. Integrating a consideration of decision-making 
across the whole forensic science process (Figure 3) offers the opportunity to identify 
common issues across different forensic domains as well as specific issues that are relevant 
to a specific domain or subset of domains. It is important to acknowledge that decision-
making studies will be most effective when they are based upon actual current processes 
which have been as fully understood as possible by the researcher through established 
ecologically valid methodologies (as set out in Phase 1), rather than solely through 
consultation of reported processes and Standard Operating Procedures.  
b) Transparent communication of research findings 
Empirical studies within forensic science and decision-making need to be peer reviewed 
and accessible to the scientific community. However, the publication of research which 
exposes issues within forensic science processes prior to the adaptation of a successful 
solution is understandably problematic. While publication and dissemination is crucial to 
enable the development of further research and applied solutions from other domains, it 
can also create vulnerabilities in the integrity of past and current processes. There is a 
growing acknowledgement of the necessity of such research, but for this type of research 
to happen to the extent that is necessary there is arguably the need to foster an environment 
where the value of this type of research is acknowledged and enabled.  This will require a 
commitment to change in a holistic manner that incorporates all the actors, institutions and 
stakeholders in the forensic science domain (Figure 3).   
c) Avoiding the communication of research findings as performance data 
It is paramount that there is a differentiation between communicating research into 
decision-making in the forensic science process as individual performance data, in order to 
avoid a ‘bad apple’ [18] blame culture which has the potential to obfuscate the critical 
underlying issues. Although decision-making research is crucially based upon studying 
participants undertaking every-day tasks within the forensic reconstruction process, the 
nature of the research design must account for the possibilities of drawing conclusions 
beyond individual participants. The need for a move towards identifying and managing the 
possibilities of misinterpretations of evidence is outlined in Phase 5. 
 
Phase 5 Managing the risk of misinterpretation 
 
The generic use of the term ‘error’ is problematic in forensic science. The terminology of 
‘error’ was first widely used within the US as a result of the introduction of the Daubert 
Standard for admissibility of evidence [123] and the later publication of the National Academy 
of Sciences Report [11]. Equally, in the UK, the need for quality standards and adhesion to 
Codes of Practice and Conduct in order to prevent error has been recently communicated by 
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the UK Forensic Science Regulator [83,122]. However, the communication surrounding errors 
within forensic science can lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations, due, in part, to 
the role of both tacit and explicit forms of knowledge within the forensic science process [47], 
confusion concerning the different types of errors that can occur [124], and, therefore, the 
misapplication of the terminology of ‘error’ and the assumption that it is always indicative of 
blame. 
Figure 4 sets out the interaction of the explicit tacit knowledge continuum as it relates to key 
parts of forensic science (from Morgan 2017b, [47]) and  the existing definitions of error within 
forensic science (from Christensen et al., 2014 [124]).  It is clear that there is a wide spectrum 
of the interplay between knowledge type and error type. 
 
 
Figure 4 - the relationship between explicit (negligence, incompetence, sabotage) and 
tacit (judgement calls, experience, heuristics, routines) knowledge and error types 
within forensic reconstruction 
Consideration of the psychological literature in relation to errors reveals a difference in 
approach and mentality around the discussion of errors in an organisational setting. Frese and 
Keith [125] discuss the tendency for a negative mind-set and language around error making, 
which is indeed, commonly referred to within the forensic science literature [19,126]. Frese et 
al. [127] first introduced the key concept of error management to the dialogue around error. 
They clearly distinguish between two organisational approaches to dealing with error: error 
prevention and error management. It is argued that all errors cannot be prevented due to their 
ubiquitous nature [125], partly due to the tendency of human cognition to be prone to heuristic 
processes [128]. Individuals and organisations, however, have a tendency to view error making 
in a negative way and as an indicator of poor performance or negligence [129], and so try to 
prevent these errors from occurring [130]. Error management is described as ‘’effectively 
dealing with errors after they have occurred with the goal of minimising negative, and 
maximising positive, error consequences’’, as opposed to the view that all errors can be 
prevented [125]. Such an approach acknowledges the inherent nature of errors and looks to 
learn and innovate as a result of them through an open and honest dialogue. Processes in error 
management primarily involve the detection of errors and the reduction or avoidance of the 
negative consequences of this error. 
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A similarly structured approach is taken to the consideration of error within the aviation 
industry, where five perspectives are taken on the nature and cause of human error; (a) a 
cognitive perspective, (b) an ergonomics and systems design perspective, (c) a medical 
perspective, (d) a psychosocial perspective, and (e) an organisational perspective [131]. Whilst 
there is benefit in the consideration of each of these areas in relation to decision-making within 
the forensic science process, it is the organisational approach that is often preferred within the 
aviation industry because it views human error as something to be managed within the context 
of risk [131]. 
Given the complex and varied nature of knowledge with the forensic science process [21], the 
breadth of error types [124], and the negative connotations of ‘error’ terminology within the 
forensic science community [19,126], alongside the inherent nature of human error [128] and 
need to expose and manage it [125], a new dialogue may be beneficial. Rather than using the 
terminology of ‘error’ it may be preferable to, instead, discuss the risky nature of forensic 
science, enabling dialogue around management of this risk (‘the impact of uncertainty on 
objectives’ [132]) that is focussed around the forensic science process rather than attributing 
blame to the individual. 
The objective of the forensic science process can be considered, at a holistic level, to be an 
accurate forensic crime reconstruction, applying science to determine the true activities of a 
crime event [21,133]. Achieving this holistic objective requires a series of ‘micro’ objectives 
throughout the forensic science process, at the explicit level (adhering to process), and at the 
tacit level (making the correct decision or appropriate decision at each stage of the process). 
There are many uncertainties associated with the outcomes at both of these levels. At a holistic 
level there is usually the absence of a reliable known ground truth to which to compare a 
forensic reconstruction, so there is inherent uncertainty that an accurate representation of events 
has been made. The lack of a comprehensive evidence base in relation to the behaviour of 
forensic trace evidence [134]) introduces uncertainty at specific stages of the forensic science 
process, and, equally, the lack of a comprehensive understanding of the human examiner, as 
discussed in Phase 3, introduces a level of uncertainty to interpretations. Indeed, more complex 
processes, or those involving complex chains of activities and decisions will lead to a higher 
level of uncertainty. The level of interpretation and tacit knowledge required as part of a process 
will affect the level of uncertainty, and thus risk. For example, toxicological analysis based 
primarily on explicit knowledge may be low in uncertainty as calibration and standard 
operating procedures can be employed, and any deviation can be identified and measured, 
reducing the risk. The comparison of footwear evidence, however, relies on tacit knowledge 
and expertise (that which is more difficult to codify [47]), thereby increasing the uncertainty 
and thus the risk. Knowing about the existence of uncertainties means that we can include these 
in our reasoning, increasing the transparency of interpretations and reducing the risk of 
misinterpretation. A key consideration is that, whilst we may be aware of some of the 
uncertainties inherent in forensic science processes, there are also those uncertainties that we 
are unable to codify, either because we cannot accurately predict these, or because we do not 
know that they exist. Knowing where uncertainty lies means that we can build up a picture of 
the risk associated with a process and determine the acceptable level of that risk. Thus, research 
into the human factors associated with forensic processes is key to codifying some of these 
uncertainties and communicating them effectively to reduce the risk of misinterpretation at 
each stage of the forensic science process.  
The challenge for the forensic science community is acknowledging these uncertainties and 
determining what level of risk is acceptable and, indeed, what level of risk can be effectively 
communicated when it comes to presenting the meaning of the evidence. The ethos of risk 
management rather than prevention is key here so as to ensure that there is transparency and 
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reproducibility in the way inferences are made and conclusions are drawn, and to ensure that 
the forensic community is able to learn and innovate. 
A good example of the management (as opposed to prevention) of risk comes from the domain 
of fingermark visualisation. The Fingermark Visualisation Manual (FVM) [135] produced by 
the Home Office Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, provides recommendations as 
to the most effective fingermark visualisation techniques to apply according to the composition 
and condition of a given substrate from the crime scene. Those techniques that have been 
comprehensively validated following the recommended fingerprint visualisation techniques 
research methodology set out by Sears et al. [136], including laboratory based comparative 
studies and operational trials (thus reducing uncertainty) are provided as ‘Category A’ 
processes and are recommended for routine use. However, the manual also includes techniques 
and processes that are at earlier stages of development. These are supported by less validation 
studies, perhaps have not been trialled in case work, and so carry a greater level of uncertainty 
and thus risk. The FVM clearly makes a distinction between the category of technique so that 
practitioners can be aware of the risk involved. The lower category (more risky) techniques 
may be employed after other techniques have been attempted, or if there are no other options 
given the condition of the substrate from the scene. This provides a framework for practitioners 
to consider risk in their treatment selection decision-making and also in the interpretation of 
their findings, for example if no marks are produced through the use of a technique within a 
lower category of the manual there are more unknowns present, as this may be due to the fact 
that the technique has not been optimised rather than the fact that there were no latent marks 
present in the first place to visualise. 
Challenges in the appropriate management of risk can be observed in relation to the 
accreditation of forensic processes to the UKAS standards of ISO 17025 and 17020 [83]. These 
are models of accreditation designed to accredit codified, or explicit, knowledge, however 
significant challenges and issues become clear when this same approach is applied to accredit 
the expertise of CSIs and fingerprint examiners which is founded in an interaction of tacit 
knowledge with explicit knowledge [47,49]. As a result, accreditation has the capacity to 
reduce the uncertainty in relation to the explicit knowledge and procedural aspects of the tasks 
undertaken, but cannot comprehensively consider the level of uncertainty associated with 
expertise. Thus accreditation does not holistically manage the risk as it does not account for 
the unknown uncertainty in the process [49]. 
Research into human factors as applied to the forensic science process, as outlined in Phase 3 
can help to reduce the unknowns and reduce the amount of uncertainty. A cultural change is 
needed to ensure that the forensic community can adopt and operate with the notion of risk 
being inherent within the forensic science process so as to embrace human factors research 
which will, undoubtedly, lead to the uncovering of further uncertainties. It is only by being 
open to acknowledging the findings of human factors research that the forensic community can 
be comprehensively transparent about the strengths, weaknesses, and uncertainties of the 
processes used, thus being transparent about the risk involved, strengthening the reliability of 
forensic science evidence interpretation. Stepping away from a culture of blame and instead 
embracing a dialogue of risk, enables the forensic science community to openly explore 
decision-making within the forensic science process; determining where issues exist, 
increasing understanding of the human interpretation processes involved, and finding ways in 
which decision-making processes can be improved in order to ensure the integrity and reliably 
of forensic evidence. 
Phase 6 Fostering the inclusion of decision-making as part of the forensic science 
process through learning and training  
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There has been some acknowledgement by researchers, policy makers, and regulators that 
solutions to the known effects of cognitive bias should be put in place [24,42,97,137] and there 
has been a drive to inform practitioners of the dangers of cognitive bias. However, there needs 
to be a more holistic consideration of the human factors throughout the forensic science process 
and the ways in which learning and training can maximise the effectiveness of the human 
practitioner. Indeed, there is an argument for incorporating human factors at the heart of 
forensic science learning and training due to i) the ubiquitous nature of human factors and 
decision-making embedded throughout the forensic science process, ii) the intrinsic necessity 
to incorporate both explicit and tacit forms of knowledge in that process, and iii) the learner is 
human.  
It is beneficial to consider the divide between learning and training in terms of the types of 
knowledge required of the forensic practitioner. As discussed in Phase 5 there is a combination 
of explicit (or codifiable) knowledge and tacit knowledge (or expertise) required throughout 
the forensic science process [47]. Training in a task can enable the development of specific 
skills required for explicit tasks such as following a standard operating procedure or using a 
new piece of software. However, acquiring and imparting tacit knowledge and the development 
of expertise is a more complex process. In relation to the approach that is needed where tacit 
knowledge and expertise is key, it is important to  
i) determine all situations in which tacit knowledge is required for decision-making and making 
interpretations,  
ii) have an evidence based understanding of the critical human factors involved in these 
situations,  
iii) consider where this uncertainty is inherent and needs to be built into how findings are 
communicated (ie being clear what the ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns’ are),  
iv) establish where there is uncertainty and where this uncertainty can be reduced through 
education (learning and training), and,  
v) to consider the most effective mechanism for delivering the most appropriate education 
(ideally based upon the pedagogic literature and best practice from other domains that rely 
upon human expertise).  
Thus the learning of a forensic practitioner should encompass both training that imparts the 
required explicit knowledge and skills needed to carry out specific tasks and procedures, as 
well as the learning required that enables and supports the development of tacit knowledge and 
expertise. 
There is also a need to drive a cultural change in which human factors are recognised as an 
integral part of the forensic science process. Arguably, cultural changes only occur with both 
bottom-up and top-down approaches.  There is a need for bottom-up changes, where decision-
making theories are incorporated into research- and practice-led teaching at an early stage. This 
will foster a culture where future stakeholders within the forensic science domain will be 
equipped to be sensitive to incorporating how decisions are made, what variables may influence 
those decisions, how to combat any issues that may arise, and how to enhance performance in 
the judgment and decision-making taking place in forensic reconstructions [24,41]. 
There is still however a distinct lack of clarity regarding just how the body of knowledge on 
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the application of decision theories within forensic science can be beneficial in the learning 
and training process. This is an important area to consider going forward.  In particular creating 
environments where education approaches foster in students i) critical thinking skills, ii) a 
willingness to fail in order to identify solutions to challenges and refinements to existing 
approaches, iii) an interdisciplinary mind-set where common themes are identified and an 
ability to transfer ideas and approaches across domains in coherent and context sensitive ways 
is encouraged, iv) an ability to identify the unknowns, and develop approaches to creating new 
knowledge that addresses those gaps that are strategic for enhancing forensic reconstruction 
approaches. In so doing, as a community, we can foster a culture where the importance of the 
‘scientific endeavour’ [133] in forensic reconstruction is cultivated. 
 
Bottom-up approaches will also be critical to achieving the incorporation and awareness of 
human decision-making in robust and transparent forensic reconstructions.  However, given 
the complex ecosystem within which forensic science is situated, a consideration of the role 
that top-down initiatives can play will also be critical for a holistic and wholesale approach that 
resonates with the whole forensic science process.  Creating a true culture change where 
forensic science practice, research, policy, investigations and the courts are enabled and 
equipped to engage with forensic science evidence that is transparently articulated and 
appropriately presented at the different stages within the forensic science process, will be 
critical [47]. Only if the full spectrum of knowledge is valued, and a common language 
established to communicate uncertainty, will an environment be created that values holistic 
approaches to learning and training, and that can sustain and enable the collaborations that are 




Although more research has been undertaken recently within forensic science that addresses 
the significance and impact of decisions made throughout the process from crime scene to 
court, we have argued that there is the need for a more structured and inclusive approach, and 
present a 6 phase model that suggests the key attributes that should be incorporated into a fuller 
understanding of decision making in forensic science reconstruction approaches. Because of 
the many interdependencies of the decisions made within the wider criminal justice system, 
improving the desired outcomes of decisions within forensic science and reducing the 
likelihood of misinterpretation starts with an improved understanding of the nature and 
significance of all the key decisions (phases 1 and 2). Empirical research clearly has an 
important role in understanding these decisions and in testing and applying a range of theories 
and approaches from the psychology domain (phase 3) to these decisions.  Successfully 
communicating and disseminating this foundational understanding into the wider criminal 
justice system in order to facilitate operational improvements (phase 4) can then be considered 
and developed. The model highlights that, in order to fully incorporate theoretical knowledge 
of decision-making into practice, a culture of risk management (rather than a language of error 
prevention) needs to be embraced, and education, (learning and training) needs to target both 
explicit and tacit knowledge to enable a bottom up cultural change within an overarching 
environment that can sustain that change (phase 5 and 6). 
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